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MANDATORY ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYEE
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS:
UNMITIGATED EVIL OR BLESSING IN
DISGUISE?
THEODORE J. ST. ANTOINE*
Things are seldom what they seem:
Skim milk masquerades as cream;
Highlows pass as patent leathers;
Jackdaws strut in peacock's feathers ....
Black sheep dwell in every fold;
All that glitters is not gold.
W.S. Gilbert
H.M.S. Pinafore
One of the hottest current issues in employment law is the use of
mandatory arbitration to resolve workplace disputes. Typically, an
employer will make it a condition of employment that employees
must agree to arbitrate any claims arising out of the job, including
claims based on statutory rights against discrimination, instead of
going to court. On the face of it, this is a brazen affront to public
policy. Citizens are being deprived of the forum provided them by
law. And indeed numerous scholars and public and private bodies
have condemned the use of mandatory arbitration.' Yet the insight
of that great Nineteenth Century English social philosopher, W.S.
Gilbert's Little Buttercup, may apply here: "Things are seldom what
they seem." Perhaps the validity of mandatory arbitration should
depend more on a pragmatic assessment of what is likely to be best
in practice for the great majority of workers, employers, and the
* James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law, University of Michigan. The text is
a version of the Krinock Lecture delivered at the Thomas M. Cooley Law School in Lansing,
Michigan, on October 7, 1997.
1. See, e.g., David E. Feller, Fender Bender or Train Wreck?: The Collision Between
Statutory Protection of Individual Employee Rights and the Judicial Revision of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 41 ST. LouIs L.J. 561 (1997); Joseph R. Grondin, Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J.
1 (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990's, 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 1017 (1996). See also
infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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public, rather than on abstract notions about the inviolability of
statutory claims and the sanctity of the right to a jury trial. At least
arguably, in light of an overworked, underfunded Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and backlogged federal court
dockets, most employees might be better off with mandatory
arbitration, even of statutory claims, provided there were due process
guarantees and the arbitrator could furnish the full range of statutory
remedies.
Before reaching the practical considerations, a brief look at the
legal framework is in order. Almost a quarter century ago, the
Supreme Court appeared to lay to rest any idea that private arbitration
could displace an employee's ability to resort to statutory procedures.
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,2 the Court held an arbitrator's
adverse decision under a collective bargaining agreement did not
prevent a black employee from pursuing in court a claim that his
discharge was based on racial discrimination in violation of Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Court reasoned that the arbitrator
was only authorized to decide the contractual issue of discrimination,
and not the statutory issue. Apparently the Court was untroubled that
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) routinely "defers" to
arbitrators' rulings regarding employees' rights under the National
Labor Relations Act.4  Maybe the real reason for the result in
Gardner-Denver was skepticism about union zeal in pressing Title VII
cases as distinguished from cases of anti-union discrimination.
Six years ago the Supreme Court seemed to take a sharp turn
away from the Gardner-Denver approach. In Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,' the Court held that an individual
stockbroker employee was bound by a contract with the New York
Stock Exchange to arbitrate a claim of age discrimination against his
employer. The Court distinguished Gardner-Denver on the grounds
that in Gilmer the arbitrator was authorized to handle statutory as well
2. 415 U.S. 36 (1974); see also Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728
(1981) (noting that employees are not barred by arbitration award on wage claim under union
contract from suing under Fair Labor Standards Act). In Gardner-Denver, the Court noted
that the arbitrator's award could be admitted into evidence in subsequent court proceedings,
and, if certain procedural safeguards were observed, it could be accorded "great weight."
Gardner-Denver415 U.S. at 60 n.21.
3. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 1994).
4. See, e.g., Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B.
1080 (1955).
5. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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as contractual disputes. Furthermore, the Court stressed that no loss
of statutory rights occurred in Gilmer; it was only a change of forum.
Gilmer could easily have been decided on such old-fashioned grounds
as the failure of the plaintiff to exhaust internal remedies. There,
unlike Gardner-Denver, no arbitration proceedings had been conduct-
ed. That makes all the more significant the Court's readiness to go
out of its way to endorse arbitration as a final dispute-resolution
mechanism, even when made a condition of employment. Even so,
the Court commented that the stockbroker was not precluded from
filing a charge with EEOC; it was only his court action that was
barred.
Gardner-Denver and Gilmer can be distinguished in several ways,
some more plausible than others. The Court's own emphasis on the
authority of the arbitrator will make little difference, if unions and
employers can simply empower arbitrators in the labor contract to
deal with statutory issues. More persuasive on the existence of a real
distinction is the view of Judge Harry Edwards in Cole v. Burns
International Security Services.' Speaking for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit, he emphasized that in individual contracts of employment,
the employee maintains control over the arbitration presentation while
the union is in control in the collective bargaining setting. On the
other hand, in terms of bargaining power, one might argue that a
union's agreement to arbitrate and waive the judicial forum should be
more acceptable-less of a "contract of adhesion"-than an isolated
individual employee's agreement.
The legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act contains
some strong language indicating that arbitration should not displace
Title VII processes, the subject of Gardner-Denver.7 The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), involved in Gilmer,
expressly permits waivers under certain prescribed conditions.8 It has
also been suggested that Title VII's protections against discrimination
because of race, sex, religion, and natural origin implicate more
6. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
7. Although section 118 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat.
1081 (1991), encouraged the use of alternative means of dispute resolution "[w]here
appropriate," the House Report emphasized that ADR procedures were only intended to
"supplement" and not "supplant" Title VII rights and remedies. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1),
at I (1991). Two leading legislators disavowed Gilmer. See 137 CONG. REC. S15473 (1991)
(Rep. Edwards). Cf Martin v. Dana Corp., 114 F.3d 428 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc) (ordering
rehearing).
8. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 626() (1994) (waiver must be "knowing and voluntary").
1998]
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sensitive rights than the right against discrimination because .of age,
which was at issue in Gilmer.9 That particular distinction might have
had a greater appeal for some of us a few years earlier in our life
spans. Finally, it can be argued that job applicants like Gilmer have
less of an equity in their jobs than an incumbent employee such as
Alexander may have had.
The distinction which has stood up in the eyes of most courts is
that between a collective bargaining agreement and an individual
contract of employment. The courts of appeals have generally
sustained individual agreements to arbitrate as barring court suits, °
but have rejected employers' objections to court actions because of an
arbitration clause in a union contract." Only the Fourth Circuit, in a
2-1 decision, concluded that Gilmer had superseded Gardner-Denver
even as to collective bargaining agreements.' 2  And the Fourth
Circuit holding could also be explained on an exhaustion-of-remedies
theory; there had been no recourse to the arbitration procedure
provided by the union contract prior to the court suit. Perhaps a
crucial question in the collective bargaining context should be whether
the union has actually agreed to waive employees' rights to a statutory
forum or merely added a contractual claim. In none of these cases
have the courts drawn distinctions because the rights arose under Title
VII rather than ADEA.
Significant points made by various courts of appeal include the
notion that at least an employee's waiver of Title VII rights, remedies,
and procedures must be "knowing,"' 3 although another court
declined to pass on whether a waiver had to be knowing and
9. Age is not a "suspect" classification. See generally Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
. 10. See generally Cole v. Bums Int'l Security Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(holding that due process standards would have to be observed and that (2-1) the employer
would have to pay all the arbitrator's fees); Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d
222 (3d Cir. 1997); Rojas v. TK Communications, 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996). But see
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co. No. 97-15698, 1998 WL 227469 (9th Cir. May 8,
1998) (distinguishing Gilmer and rejecting mandatory arbitration in a Title VII case).
11. See generally Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (0 th Cir.
1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997); Varner v. National Super
Markets, 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996).
12. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 432 (1996). The Supreme Court will have the opportunity to revisit
the issue in Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1162 (1998).
13. See generally Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 812 (1995).
[Vol. 15:1
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voluntary. 4  Still another court opined that a mere disparity in
bargaining power doesn't mean a lack of voluntariness.'5 Finally, in
a decision of considerable potential importance if extended beyond its
particular facts, the Seventh Circuit held that there must be extra
consideration besides providing employment in order to make binding
an employee's promise to arbitrate a statutory claim.'6
Two federal agencies and a couple of private bodies have
weighed in against mandatory arbitration of statutory employment
claims. In a July 1995 policy statement, the EEOC declared:
"[P]arties must knowingly, willingly, and voluntarily enter into an
ADR proceeding."' 7 According the to EEOC, an employee should
be able to withdraw from a proceeding any time before a decision is
rendered. Gilmer can be regarded as involving at best a "knowing"
agreement on the employee's part. It was hardly "voluntary" in the
EEOC sense of the word. The General Counsel of the NLRB seemed
ready at one point to issue unfair labor practice complaints against
any effort to impose mandatory arbitration agreements, but later that
was apparently limited to attempts to prevent the filing of charges
with the NLRB. 8
The December 1994 Report of the Dunlop Commission on the
Future of Worker-Management Relations stated: "[A]ny choice
between available methods for enforcing statutory employment rights
should be left to the individual who feels wronged rather than dictated
by his or her employment contract."' 9 But the Commission hinted
at the possibility of more flexibility by suggesting that the issue be
revisited after there was more experience with the arbitration of
statutory claims. Finally, the National Academy of Arbitrators at its
May 1997 meeting expressed its opposition to "mandatory employ-
ment arbitration as a condition of employment when it requires waiver
of direct access to either a judicial or administrative forum for the
pursuit of statutory rights."20 But the Academy added that, given the
14. SeegenerallyGibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinic, 121 F.3d 1126(7th Cir. 1997).
15. See generally Great W. Mortgage Corp., 110 F.3d at 222.
16. See generally Gibson, 121 F.3d at 1126.
17. 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 405:7302 (1997).
18. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
19. COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'TS
OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 33 (Dec. 1994) [hereinafter
COMMISSION].
20. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, STATEMENT ON CONDITION OF EMPLOY-
MENT AGREEMENTS (May 1997).
1998]
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present state of the law, its members could serve as arbitrators in such
cases. Members nonetheless were advised to observe certain
guidelines as to the fairness of these procedures. A broadly constitut-
ed Task Force sponsored by the American Bar Association (ABA)
took no position in a May 1995 "Protocol" concerning the timing
(pre-dispute or post-dispute) of arbitration agreements-and thus
effectively their "voluntariness"--but it did agree they should be
"knowingly made." 2'
There has been a reasonable degree of consensus on the procedur-
al requirements for a fair arbitration, whether voluntary or mandatory.
Thus, both the Dunlop Commission Report and the Protocol of the
ABA Task Force came up with very similar sets of due process
guarantees. They include: 22
1. a jointly selected neutral arbitrator who knows the law;
2. simple, adequate discovery;
3. cost-sharing to ensure arbitrator neutrality;23
4. representation by a person of the employee's choice;
21. A Due Process Protocolfor Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising
Out of the Employment Relationship, Disp. RESOL. J. 37 (Oct.-Dec. 1995) [hereinafter
Protocol]. The Task Force consisted of management, union, and plaintiffs' attorneys from
the ABA and the National Employment Lawyers Association and representatives of the
American Arbitration Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service, the National Academy of Arbitrators, and the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution.
22. See COMMISSION, supra note 19, at 30-32; Protocol, supra note 21, at 38-39.
23. In Cole, 105 F.3d at 1465, the court (2-1) required the employer to pay all the
arbitrator's fees as a condition for enforcing the employee's waiver of a judicial forum.
Surely Judge Edwards, speaking for the majority, was right that the source of payment is not
the key to arbitrator neutrality. Arbitrators are naturally concerned about getting their fee,
but ordinarily not about where it comes from. The more delicate problem, at least as a
matter of appearances, is who chooses the arbitrator. Employers are far more likely to be
"repeat players" in arbitration than employees. Thus, an arbitrator's continuing acceptability
probably turns more on employer than employee attitudes. This is not a matter on which the
source of payment is going to have much effect. One has to count primarily on the inherent
integrity of the great body of arbitrators-and on their knowledge that recognition of that
integrity in the labor-management community is indispensable for their capacity to practice.
Cole may have gone too far in insisting that an employer pay all the arbitrator's fee.
Access to a court, at least initially, would ordinarily not be cost-free. Some modest but
reasonable sharing of the arbitrator's charges may serve as a realistic deterrent to an
employee's filing of frivolous claims. If the employee ultimately prevails, then the arbitrator,
like a court, could apportion fees and costs accordingly.
HeinOnline  -- 15 T. M. Cooley L. Rev. 6 1998
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5. remedies equal to those provided by the law;
6. a written opinion and award, with reasons; and
7. limited judicial review, concentrating on the law.
At least three distinguished federal appellate judges have publicly
extolled the advantages of arbitration over litigation in vindicating
statutory rights against discrimination. These were Judges Harry
Edwards of the District of Columbia Circuit, Betty Fletcher of the
Ninth Circuit, and Alvin Rubin of the Fifth Circuit.2 4 They stressed
arbitration's merits of speed, cost savings, and relative informality.
None of these endorsements dealt with mandatory arbitration. But at
least they should dispose of concerns about the competency of trained
arbitrators to handle the usual statutory interpretive problems in a
discrimination case.
The case for allowing mandatory arbitration-permitting
employers to condition employment upon an employee's agreement
to arbitrate rather than litigate workplace claims, including statutory
rights against discrimination-is counter-intuitive and highly practical.
It reflects a willingness to take the professional or mid-level manage-
ment employee's opportunity to get before a jury with a rare seven or
high-six-figure claim, and trade it for the only realistic opportunity
that most lower-level workers will have to recover a job and a modest
financial award. Experienced litigators across the country tell me that
the good plaintiffs' attorneys will accept on the average only about
one in a hundred of the discrimination claimants who seek their help.
One of the Detroit area's top employment specialists was more
precise. His secretary kept an actual count; he took on one out of
eighty-seven persons who contacted him for possible representation.
Now, of course, some of those who are rejected will be individuals
without meritorious claims. But others will be workers whose
24. See generally Harry T. Edwards, Advantages of Arbitration over Litigation:
Reflections of a Judge, ARBITRATION 1982: CONDUCT OF THE HEARING, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 35TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 16, 27, 28 (James L.
Stem & Barbara D. Dennis eds., 1983); Betty Binns Fletcher, Arbitration of Title VII Claims:
Some Judicial Perceptions, ARBITRATION ISSUES FOR THE 1980S, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 34Th
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 218-28 (James L. Stem &
Barbara D. Dennis eds., 1982); Alvin B. Rubin, Arbitration: Toward a Rebirth, TRUTH, LIE
DETECTORS, AND OTHER PROBLEMS IN LABOR ARBITRATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3 1 ST
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 30,36 (James L. Stem & Barbara
D. Dennis eds., 1979).
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potential dollar recovery will simply not justify the investment of the
time and money of a first-rate lawyer in preparing a court action. For
those individuals, the cheaper, simpler process of arbitration is the
most feasible recourse.
Ideally, an employee would be offered the choice of arbitration
after a dispute has arisen, not at some previous point in the employ-
ment relationship. If an employee has been discharged, for example,
there is nothing much to lose by refusing to arbitrate, and thus any
agreement is much likelier to be voluntary in the fullest sense. But
there was credible testimony by management representatives before
the Dunlop Commission that employers would generally not be
willing to enter into post-dispute agreements to arbitrate. For most
run-of-the-mill claims, employers will be inclined to wait them out,
assuming that the great bulk will go nowhere. Workers will not have
the gumption to pursue lesser claims, and they probably will not find
lawyers to take their cases if they try.
For employers, the desired trade-off is the one big case against
the many smaller ones. Even if successful, a defense before a jury
will cost $100,000 to $200,000 or more. And a professional arbitrator
will be less disposed than an emotionally aroused jury to hand out
seven-figure awards. But, conversely, a few employees and their
lawyers will be willing to arbitrate the big case rather than take it to
a jury. So for management, the sensible strategy is to agree to
arbitrate only if everything can be included, and that almost necessari-
ly means an agreement before any dispute arises. If employers are
not bluffing, therefore, the only choice for the ordinary worker with
an ordinary claim may be a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate--or
nothing.
The EEOC will not be the salvation of the employee with a
minimal case. Before a severely overburdened Commission resorted
to its "triage" procedure two years ago, classifying cases as "A, "B,"
or "C" priorities depending on merit and importance, and tossing out
many charges after the briefest of investigations, its backlog had
soared past 100,000 and it was receiving almost 100,000 new charges
a year. 26 The situation is so bleak that Professor Maurice Munroe of
25. SeegenerallyCOMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS,
U.S. DEP'TS OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, FACT FINDING REPORT 118 (May 1994). See also
Protocol, supra note 21, at 37.
26. See generally 149 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 13, 14 (May 1, 1995); 151 LAB. REL.
REP. (BNA) 143, 156 (Feb. 5, 1996).
[Vol. 15:1
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the Thomas M. Cooley Law School has recommended, quite under-
standably, that the EEOC get out of the business of handling
individual charges and husband its limited resources for routing out
systemic unlawful practices.1
7
Finally, even if individual claimants can get to court, there is no
guarantee they will fare any better there than they would before an
arbitrator. A considerably more conservative judiciary than existed
in earlier years may be all too willing to grant summary judgment
against those civil rights plaintiffs who do manage to file suit.
Without more empirical evidence about the actual experience of
discrimination victims, we could be mistaken in condemning
mandatory arbitration out of hand. It may well be the most realistic
hope of the ordinary claimant.2"
27. See generally Maurice E.R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect,
13 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 219 (1995).
28. For more recent and more sympathetic academic treatments ofmandatory arbitration,
see Richard A. Bales, Creating and Challenging Compulsory Arbitration Agreements, 13
LAB. LAW 511 (1998); Susan A. FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, 1 EMPLOYEE
RTS. & EMPLOYEE POL'Y J. 221 (1997).
1998l
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